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Abstract Authentication refers to the process of confirming the identity of the au-
thenticating entity. The use of passwords for user authentication has become ubiqui-
tous in our everyday lives. Despite its wide-spread usage, password-based authenti-
cation has numerous deficiencies. For instance, password theft is becoming a com-
mon occurrence due to a variety of security problems associated with passwords.As
such, many organizations are moving towards adopting alternative solutions like
one-time passwords, which are only valid for a single session. Nevertheless, vari-
ous one-time password schemes also suffer from a number of drawbacks in terms
of their method of generation or delivery. In this chapter, we present a challenge-
response visual one-time password authentication scheme that is to be used in con-
junction with the camera on a mobile device. The main feature of the proposed
scheme is to allow the server to send a challenge over a public channel for a user to
obtain a session key while safeguarding the user’s long-term secret key. We present
the authentication protocol, its security analysis, the various design considerations
and the advantages provided by our system.
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1 Introduction
In the digital age, passwords are widely used in our daily lives. We authenticate to
numerous electronic services over the Internet via username and password. Despite
the development of many alternatives, text passwords are still the most dominant
form of web authentication due to its convenience and simplicity [30]. However, the
use of passwords has been shown to be plagued by various security problems [4, 5].
In addition, over the years, many security attacks, such as spyware and phishing at-
tacks, have been developed to extract sensitive information from computers, emails,
fraudulent websites, etc. Consequently, password theft has become a common oc-
currence.
For this reason, many business companies and organizations are moving towards
adopting alternative solutions to the traditional static password approach. Static
password approaches are particularly vulnerable as these passwords can easily be
stolen by an adversary via a variety of means (e.g. keyloggers, phishing attacks,
Trojans, etc.), and used without the password owner’s knowledge.
This has led to the increasing popularity of two-factor authentication (2FA), a
technology that confirms the identity of an entity by the combination of two com-
ponents. An example of 2FA is Google’s authentication framework, which uses a
two-step verification [11]. In Google’s two-step verification, the first step involves
the user using the traditional username and static password authentication. In the
step second, the user will be asked to input a six-digit verification code for which
the user can obtain through a variety of different means. Examples of these means
include a Short Message Service (SMS) text message, a voice call to a preregistered
phone number, a list of pre-generated one-time codes, or an offline application pre-
installed on the user’s smartphone. The second step is often known as a One-Time
Password (OTP) scheme, where the verification code (the OTP) is only valid for a
single session.
There are a number of ways in which OTPs can be generated and distributed.
Below we briefly discuss these methods and their limitations.
• OTP via SMS. One common method of distributing the OTPs is to transmit it via
an SMS text message. Mulliner [22] argues that this method cannot be considered
secure. Firstly, the security of SMS OTP relies on the confidentiality of the SMS
messages, which in turns relies on the security of the cellular networks. However,
this may not be the case as there are already several potential attacks that can be
conducted on these services. Secondly, specialized mobile phone trojans have
been created to compromise the security of SMS OTP approaches. Finally, this
approach also has its usability issue since it can be problematic if the user is in a
location with poor mobile phone reception.
• OTP via Security Token. This method is commonly used by banks and financial
institutions. A security token which generates OTPs is supplied to the user. The
token is capable of generating OTPs using a time-dependent algorithm to gen-
erate pseudo-random numbers to be used as the OTPs. This approach relies on
accurate time synchronization between the token and the authentication server, as
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the OTPs generated using this approach are only valid for a short period of time.
As such, this approach suffers from synchronization issues and the potential for
clock skew [27].
• OTP from hash chains. As a variant of OTP via security token, the OTPs can
be generated based on a one-way function in the form of a hash chain. However,
hash chains are known to have storage and computational complexity issues [28].
The growing popularity of smartphone has opened up a new possibility in the
support of two-factor authentication since the smartphone itself can be treated as
the second component in the process. In this book chapter, we propose a challenge-
response visual OTP authentication scheme that uses the camera on a mobile device
to obtain the OTP. The design goal of the scheme is to supporting the transmission
of the challenge over a public channel for a user to obtain a session key while safe-
guarding the user’s long-term secret key. Our approach is based on the concept of
visual cryptography and as such does not rely on mobile phone network reception,
or having to establish a network link between a computer and a mobile phone. We
present the construction of our scheme and its security analysis, along with various
practical issues that had to be considered in the design of the visual OTP scheme.
1.1 Our Contribution.
This chapter presents the design of a visual one-time password authentication
scheme. The proposed scheme is a challenge-response approach that relies on a
camera on a mobile device to receive the challenge and to present the response on
the mobile device’s display. The advantage of this approach is that it does not suffer
from common OTP issues such as poor reception, hash chain complexities or the re-
quirement on time synchronization. In addition, unlike SMS-based approaches, our
approach is not restricted to mobile phones and can be used on any mobile device
with a camera and a display, including tablet computers. In the proposed scheme, the
challenge can even be sent on printed media instead of via electronic means. This
book chapter is an extension of our scheme published in [6] and include security
analysis and concrete instantiations of the algorithm.
2 Related Work
A number of authentication mechanisms exists. In this section, we review the re-
search in the area of authentication that is relevant to our system.
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2.1 Visual Authentication
The notion of using human-computer cryptographic approaches for identification
and authentication have been around for many years. Typically, these approaches
implement a challenge-response mechanism that requires a human user to inter-
act with a computer in some manner in order to perform authentication. For ex-
ample, Matsumoto [20, 21] investigated human-computer cryptographic schemes
that presented challenges to users in the form of visual images. The approach that
was examined in his study was based on the capability of human beings in mem-
orizing and processing images to solve some simple challenges. Since then, other
researchers and practitioners have also proposed and developed various graphical
password schemes. Graphical passwords attempt to leverage human memory for vi-
sual information with the shared secret being related to images [2]. This capitalizes
on the natural human ability to remember images, which is believed to exceed mem-
ory for text [5]. However, graphical passwords are not immune to security attacks.
For example, graphical password schemes may suffer from shoulder surfing attacks
where credentials are captured through direct observation of the login process, or by
recording the process using a recording device [2].
Other schemes that have been proposed in this area are based on using the human
visual system to solve the challenge. Naor and Pinkas [23] proposed an authentica-
tion and identification approach that is based on visual cryptography. Visual cryp-
tography was introduced by Naor and Shamir [24] as a means of using images to
conceal information. The main idea behind visual cryptography is to divide a secret
image into a set of shares, each to be printed on a separate transparency. Individu-
ally, the shares look like random black and white pixels that reveal no information
about the secret image. When the appropriate number of shares are stacked together,
the human visual system averages the black and white pixel contributions of the su-
perimposed shares to recover the hidden information. Thus, the concealed informa-
tion can be decrypted by the human visual system without any need of a computer
to perform decryption computations [7]. Figure 1 depicts an example of Naor and
Shamir’s visual cryptography scheme. The secret image, shown in Figure 1(a), is
divided into two shares, which are shown in Figures 1(b) and 1(c) respectively. The
secret can be recovered by superimposing the two shares, as shown in Figure 1(d).
In the scheme proposed by Naor and Pinkas [23], the user is required to carry
a small transparency, small enough to be carried in a wallet, and the authentication
and identification process simply involves the user overlaying the transparency on
the message sent by an informant in order to view the concealed information. How-
ever, in their scheme, unless the user carries a stack of transparencies, which would
be impractical, a single transparency will have to be used for multiple authentication
sessions. It has been highlighted that since basic visual cryptography schemes are
equivalent to one-time pads, an observer can eventually learn the user’s secret by re-
peated observation [5]. In addition, Naor and Shamir’s visual cryptography scheme
suffers from the pixel expansion problem, as illustrated in Figure 1, where each
pixel in the secret image is split into four sub-pixels in the shares and the recovered
image. As such, the shares are four time the size of the secret image.
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(a) (b) (c)
(d)
Fig. 1 Example of Naor and Shamir’s visual cryptography scheme. (a) Secret image; (b) Share 1;
(c) Share 2; (d) Result of superimposing shares 1 and 2.
To overcome a number of drawbacks with this scheme, Tuyls et al. [31] pro-
posed a scheme where every user was to be given a small decryption display. Their
approach was similarly based on visual cryptography where the small decryption
display was used to replace the need for transparencies. The small decryption dis-
play required very limited computing power to perform authentication and security
and since the user was required to carry his/her own trusted decryption display, it
would be impossible to be contaminated by Trojans or viruses. However, this ap-
proach requires the user to use a special authentication device.
A commercially available scheme called PassWindow [26] uses a similar ap-
proach where a small transparent display is embedded in an ID card or some form
of payment card. The pattern on the transparent display changes periodically based
on a pre-generated sequence of patterns. To perform authentication, the user has
to overlay the transparent display of the card over a patterned image sent from the
server and to visually identify the digits that form as a result of superimposing the
card’s display onto the image. However, it should be noted that an image on screen
can potentially appear at different sizes depending on the user’s display settings.
This approach requires that the size of the image that is displayed on screen be
exactly the same as the size of the card’s transparent display.
2.2 Authentication using a Personal Device
A number of other authentication approaches that have been proposed make use of
personal devices that a user usually carries around (e.g. a cellphone). In a study on
how to provide a user with authenticated communication when using an untrusted
computer, Clarke et al. [8] proposed a method of using a trusted personal device
equipped with a camera to monitor the screen of the untrusted computer. All com-
munication is then authenticated by a trusted proxy. This approach is quite costly in
terms of computational resources required to monitor the communication.
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Mannan and Oorschot [19] proposed a protocol that they called MP-Auth (Mobile
Password Authentication), which uses a mobile device to protect user passwords
from easily being recorded. In their approach, the mobile device is assumed to be
free from malware as the user will enter the password into the mobile device rather
than into an untrusted computer. In another approach proposed by Jeun et al. [15],
the user uses an application to store his encrypted password in his smart phone and
that application program is used to send the password from the smart phone itself,
instead of requiring the user to enter his password via a computer’s keyboard.
Phoolproof is another scheme that uses mobile phones for authentication. Phool-
proof is a mutual authentication protocol used to prevent phishing using a trusted
mobile phone [25]. To use the system, the user must establish a shared secret with
the server using an out-of-band channel. This long-term secret is stored on the mo-
bile phone. In order to use this protocol, the mobile phone must establish a secure
Bluetooth connection with the web-browser where mutual authentication occurs be-
tween the mobile phone and the website.
2.3 One-Time Passwords
To overcome some of the problems associated with static passwords, OTP ap-
proaches are increasingly being used for authentication. There are various tech-
niques for generating and distributing OTPs. In addition, several approaches were
devised to use OTPs in conjunction with mobile devices.
Paterson and Stebila [27] examined an approach of using OTPs in conjunction
with one-time Password Authentication Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols in order
to ensure more secure use of OTPs. In a scheme called oPass proposed by Sun et
al. [30], a trusted cellphone is used to communicate with the web server (via SMS)
and the web-browser (via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth). The user does not input his password
into the web-browser, but rather is required to enter his long-term password into the
oPass program which will generate an OTP that will be sent by way of an encrypted
SMS to the server.
Mulliner et al. [22] investigated attacks against SMS based OTPs and state that
attacks against cellular networks and mobile phones have shown that SMS messages
cannot be deemed to be secure. They proposed a virtual dedicated OTP channel in-
side the mobile phone operating system to secure OTP SMS messages from being
intercepted by Trojans by removing these messages from the general delivery pro-
cess and redirecting them to a special OTP application.
Instead of using a mobile device, Huang et al. [13] proposed a scheme where the
OTP is delivered via an instant messaging service. This approach assumes that the
website which adopts the OTP authentication method must join an instant messaging
network and use the network to communicate with the users.
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3 Syntax and Security Definition of the Visual One-Time
Password Authentication System
In this section, we first define a visual one-time password authentication system and
its application scenario. We extend this definition from the visual authentication
scheme proposed by Naor and Pinkas [23].
3.1 Syntax
A visual OTP authentication system consists of two protocols, namely, Init and
Auth, executed between entity H (Henry, aka human) and S (Sandra, aka server).
• Init. We assume both parties has a common input k, the security parameter. Upon
completion of the protocol, both parties obtained a long-term secret key lk.
• Auth. We assume both H and S has lk as the common input. For practicality, we
requires that Auth to be a two-move protocol of the following form.
– S generates a short-term secret key sk. We use Ssk to denote a visual represen-
tation of sk. S generates a random value r, and produces a visual representation
S1 which is a function of r and lk. S computes S2 = Ssk−S11. S sends (r,S2)
to H.
– Upon receiving (r, S2), H re-construct S1 from r and lk. Next, H comptues
Ssk = S1 + S2 to acquire Ssk. Using the visual capability, H can acquire sk
from Ssk.
3.2 Application Scenario and Threat Model
Without the lose of generality, we assume that there are three entities involved,
namely H (Henry), S (Sandra) and an adversary E (Evan). H is a human and there-
fore H has human visual capabilities. The purpose of the visual OTP authentication
system is to enable Sandra to attest whether Henry is present in the protocol in
the presence of Evan. Note that Evan can observe the channel used between Henry
and Sandra. The security parameter k is involved, such that storage capacities and
computing power of Sandra and Evan are polynomial in k.
There are two main stages in the visual OTP authentication scenario. The first
stage is the initialization stage, where Sandra engages Henry in protocol Init on a
secure channel, which is inaccessible to Evan.
1 We abuse the notation and assume visual representation can be ”added” and ”subtracted”. Any
concrete instantiation must specific the details of these operations.
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In the second stage, Sandra communicates with Henry in protocol Auth via a
public channel, in which Evan can also access. Upon completion of the protocol,
both Sandra and Henry has a local copy of the value sk.
The threat model assumes that Evan has access to the public channel, and there-
fore, he has access to both r and S2. Informally speaking, the goal is to ensure that
Evan cannot obtain any information about sk.
The following game between a challenger and the adversary formally define the
security of requirement.
• Initialization The challenger executes Init on behalf of both H and S to setup the
long term key lk.
• Query Phase 1. The adversary E is allowed to eavesdrop as many communication
between H and S as it wishes. Upon invocation of this query, the challenger
executes Auth on behalf of H and S with common input lk, and gives the whole
communication transcript, including the outcome, to E. That is, E will be given
r, S2, Ssk and sk.
• Challenge. The challenger flips a fair coin b ∈ {0,1} and execute Auth on behalf
of H and S to obtain (r,S2) and the resulting key sk. The challenger sets r∗ = r,
S∗2 = S2. If b = 0 it sets sk
∗ = sk. Otherwise, it sets sk∗ to be a random value.
Finally, the challenger gives (r∗, S∗2) and sk
∗ to E.
• Query Phase 2. After receiving the challenge, E can still issue the same query as
in Query phase 1.
• Guess. Finally, E outputs a bit b′.
We say that E wins the game if b = b′. Define advantage of E in the above game
as the probability that E wins minus 0.5.
Definition 1. Security. A visual OTP authentication protocol is secure if for all PPT
algorithm E, the advantage of E is negligible.
4 Proposed Visual OTP Scheme
4.1 Overview
The overall architecture of the proposed visual OTP authentication system is pre-
sented in Figure 2. We would like to remark that the private channel for the reg-
istration can be established via traditional public key cryptography (assuming H
is equipped with a public key) or an identity-based encryption [3] (assuming the
identity of H is known - in a smart phone scenario, this could be via the phone’s
International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI) or phone number).
The figure depicts an example of a practical scenario where the visual OTP
scheme can be implemented for conducting an online transaction. In the scenario,
the user must first register his mobile device with the authentication server via a
secure private channel. The server will in turn generate lk and send this to the user’s
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Fig. 2 Overview of the communication between the various components in the visual OTP scheme.
mobile device. Registration only happens once for the server and mobile device to
establish a long-term secret key. Subsequently, whenever the user initiates an online
transaction from a web-browser, the server will generate and send (QRr,S2) (i.e. the
challenge) which will be displayed on the web-browser. Upon receiving (QRr,S2),
the user will use the camera on his mobile device to scan QRr. With the value of lk
and r, the user’s mobile device will be able to generate S1. On the mobile device’s
display, S1 will be overlaid on S2 to produce S′sk (i.e. the visual reconstruction of Ssk
on the mobile device’s display), and the user will be able to visually obtain sk (i.e.
the response/OTP). Only the server can generate a valid S2, and only the user can
obtain sk using S1 which is generated on the mobile device.
4.2 Algorithm Details
Initialization Stage (Init) On input a security parameter k, we let S chooses a long-
term secret key lk ∈R {0,1}k. S trasmits lk to H via a secure and authenticated
channel. Upon successful completion of the protocol, both S and H stored lk.
Challenge-Response Stage (Auth) In this stage, S selects a random number r ∈R
{0,1} and conduct the following computation.
• Produce a Quick Response (QR) code that contains r, QRr.
• Generate a short-term secret key sk, and its visual representation Ssk.
• Execute Algorithm 1 with input lk, r and Ssk and obtain S1, S2.
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• Present QRr and S2 to H via a public channel.
Upon receiving the challenge (QRr,S2), H conducts the following:
• Scan the QR code to retrieve r.
• Reproduce S1 from lk and r based on algorithm 2.
• Use H’s visual capability to retrieve sk from the superposition of S1 and S2.
• Output sk.
Note that the value of sk is obtained visually and is never stored anywhere.
Remarks: For efficiency considerations and to allow a concrete security analysis,
we instantiate the function randomPixel(lk, r, i, j) employed in Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2 as H(lk,r,i,j) mod 2 where H is a hash function. Looking ahead, we
would model it as a random oracle in the security analysis.
4.3 Security Analysis
In the following, we prove that our protocol is secure under Definition 1 in the ran-
dom oracle model [1]. Assume there exists E which can win the game with proba-
bility ε . We use a technique known as game-hopping [10], a commonly employed
approach in cryptography, to show that ε is negligible.
• game1: We consider game1, which is the same as the original security definition
except that in the query phase 1 and 2, the transcript component r is replaced
by a random value r′ ∈R {0,1}k. In other words, the value r transmitted to E is
no longer related to S2. In the random oracle model, the advantage of E remains
unchanged except E makes a hash query on input H(r′, lk, i, j) for some i and j
within the image width. This happens with probability 1/2k since lk is hidden
from the view of E. If E makes q hash queries, the probability that this happens
is bounded above by q/2k.
• game2: We consider game2, which is the same as game1 except that rast is set to
be a random value r′ ∈R {0,1}k. Now that the transcript contains no information
about sk. Again, by the same token, the advantage of E in game2 is the same as
game1 unless a query is made on H(r∗, lk, i, j) and this happen with negligible
probability.
• Now, consider the probability that E wins in game2. Since the value r∗ is no
longer related to sk, E can only guess the value of b with probability 1/2.
• To sum up, the difference in advantage of any E between the original game and
game1 is bounded by O(q/2k) and that the advantage difference between game1
and game2 is also bounded by O(q/2k). The advantage of any E in game2 is
0. Thus, the advantage of any E in the original game is bounded by O(q/2k)+
O(q/2k) = O(q/2k) which is negligible for any PPT E whose running time is
polynomial in the security parameter k since q must be polynomial in k.
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4.4 Practical Issues
In the proposed scheme, r has to be sent to H over a public channel. While it is not
necessary to encode and transmit r within a QR code, we find that this is the most
appropriate and convenient method of delivery. The QR code is a two-dimensional
code that was invented by the company Denso Wave [9]. These days, QR codes
are ubiquitous on the Internet and the information contained within a QR code can
easily be scanned by a mobile device with a camera. In addition, QR codes have a in-
built error detection and correction mechanism that can be used to correctly decode
corrupted QR codes, which may contain certain errors. Furthermore, QR codes con-
tain a number of patterns to determine rotational orientation and alignment. Since
(QRr,S2) is sent to H as a single image, QRr can be used to facilitate the alignment
of S1 and S2.
It is well known that traditional visual cryptography suffers from the alignment
problem, in that when stacking shares, it is difficult to align the shares [18, 34].
Practical approaches typically suggest the use of some reference frame to align the
transparencies [23]. However, unlike traditional approaches that use physical trans-
parencies or tokens, our approach relies on the use of a mobile device like a smart
phone or a tablet. As such, using the camera’s video stream to capture (QRr,S2),
this can be used in conjunction with image processing techniques to overlay S1 over
S2. This is akin to techniques using in augmented reality to overlay virtual content
onto elements of the real world [32]. Adopting this method will allow the mobile
device to appropriately scale and rotate S1 in order for it to align with S2.
Another problem with traditional visual cryptography when displaying a share
on a computer screen and trying to place the corresponding share, which is printed
on a transparency, on top of the screen, is that monitors can differ greatly and the
computer can be set to different display settings. As such, the image of the share on
screen may not be displayed at the same size as the share printed on the transparency.
This will prevent the shares from being correctly superimposed, and thus the secret
cannot be recovered. In the approach proposed in this paper, we rely on the mobile
device to virtually overlay S1 over S2. This means that it does not matter what size
S2 is displayed at, as long as the mobile device can accurately capture the image of
S2, because the mobile device can scale S1 to the appropriate size. To facilitate this,
the size of the squares in S2’s image should not be too small.
As previously shown in Figure 1, traditional visual cryptography suffers from
the pixel expansion problem which significantly increases the size of the resulting
shares. While there are a number of size invariant visual cryptography schemes like
the probabilistic approaches proposed by Ito et al. [14] and Yang [33], these schemes
do not produce the ideal visual quality required for the visual OTP. Therefore, for
the purpose of generating S1 and S2, a random grid visual cryptography approach
was deemed to be the most suitable approach. Random grid visual secret sharing
was first proposed by Kefri and Keren [16], and over the years a number of ran-
dom grid approaches have been investigated [12, 29]. Using a random grid visual
cryptography scheme, it is possible to produce shares with no pixel expansion.
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In the proposed visual OTP scheme, the shared image S1 will be generated from
lk||r and a pseudo-random number generator. Thus, S1 is a random grid. S1 can be
used in conjunction with the secret image Ssk to generate the corresponding chal-
lenge image S2. Algorithm 1 gives an example of a random grid visual secret sharing
method that was adapted from Shyu [29], which can be used in the proposed visual
OTP scheme. In this approach, black pixels in Ssk are reproduced at 100% in S′sk
and white pixels (i.e. transparent pixels) are reproduced at 50%. Figure 3 shows the
results of using Algorithm 1 on a secret image. The secret image, shares 1 and 2,
along with the reconstructed image are shown in Figures 3(a), 3(b), 3(c) and 3(d)
respectively.




for i = 1 to imgWidth do
for j = 1 to imgHeight do
/* Generate S1 as a random grid */
S1[i, j]← randomPixel(lk, r, i, j) /* randomPixel() outputs 0 or 1 */
/* Generate S2 */
if Ssk[i, j] = 0 then







Algorithm 2 An algorithm for generating S1 from lk, r, imgWidth, imgHeight
function RECOVERY(imgWidth, imgHeight, lk, r)
for i = 1 to imgWidth do
for j = 1 to imgHeight do
/* Re-compute S1 from lk and r */




Another practical issue to consider when implementing the visual OTP scheme
is how clearly the user will be able to perceive the OTP in the visual reconstruction
of the secret image. For this we should consider the color of the text and the back-
ground. There are two possible variations as depicted in Figure 4, where Figure 4(a)
shows the reconstructed secret using black text on a white background and Figure
4(b) shows the reconstructed secret using white text on a black background. It has
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(a) (b) (c)
(d)
Fig. 3 Random grid visual cryptography approach. (a) Secret image; (b) Share 1; (c) Share 2; (d)
Result of superimposing shares 1 and 2.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4 Text and background color. (a) Black text on a white background; (b) White text on a black
background.
been argued that using white contents on a black background gives rise to better
perceived visual quality in the reconstructed image for images with thin lines [17].
5 Discussion
5.1 Advantages of the Visual OTP Scheme
The fundamental goal of the proposed visual OTP scheme is allow the challenge to
be sent over a public channel for the user to obtain a session key that can be used as
an OTP, while safeguarding the user’s long-term secret key. In this scheme, the user
also does not have to remember any passwords.
As mobile devices are ubiquitous in this day and age, the proposed approach
does not require the user to carry around a specialized authentication card or device,
or a printed list of OTPs. In addition, unlike authentication schemes like SMS OTP
based approaches, authentication in the proposed method does not require any form
of communication with a mobile phone network. As such, mobile phone network
reception is not an issue. This also means that the visual OTP scheme can be applied
to any mobile device which has a camera and is not restricted to only be usable on
smart phones. The user simply has to install the visual OTP software and register it
with the authentication server.
While the OTP can be used to authenticate the user, another feature provided by
the scheme is that the user can also verify that the message containing the challenge
was sent by a legitimate party. This is because in the proposed scheme, without
knowledge of the long-term secret key an adversary cannot generate a valid chal-
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lenge. This also prevents an adversary from tampering with the challenge image,
as changing QRr will mean that the mobile device will not be able to generate the
correct visual pattern (i.e. S1) to solve the challenge, and changing S2 will not pro-
duce a valid result when overlaying S1 over S2. Furthermore, such an event would
raise the suspicion of the user, as it would indicate that the challenge may have been
tampered with.
Another advantage of the proposed scheme, is that the challenge does not have
to be transmitted via electronic means. For example, if a bank wants to send a letter
to an individual who has registered with the bank, the bank can send the person a
letter with the challenge printed on paper. The person can verify that the letter was
indeed sent from the bank (as only the bank can generate a valid challenge) and also
receive the OTP which can be used for authentication purposes with the bank.
In other authentication approaches that involve the user having to overlay a trans-
parency or an authentication token on top of another pattern, the size of the patterns
have to perfectly match. Otherwise the user will not be able to recover the secret
by superimpose the different sized patterns. This is not an issue in the proposed ap-
proach as the mobile device will be responsible for scaling and aligning the patterns.
Therefore, the challenge can be displayed in any size as long as it can be captured
by the mobile device’s camera. The mobile device will then use augmented reality
techniques to overlay the virtual pattern onto the image of the challenge pattern.
It should be noted that the OTP is obtained by the human user via the visual
channel and the OTP is never stored on any device. This prevents malicious soft-
ware like keyloggers or even software designed to monitor the user’s activities from
obtaining the OTP. Furthermore, the one-time password is only valid for a single
use. Additionally, the video stream on the mobile device will be used to overlay
the visual patterns and present this to the user in real-time. If there is any software
designed to monitor the user’s activities, this will require a huge amount of informa-
tion to be streamed to the adversary, which will significantly degrade the system’s
performance and alert the user of suspicious activity.
In addition, unlike traditional graphical passwords, which may suffer from shoul-
der surfing attacks, this is not an issue in the proposed visual scheme. Shoulder
surfing attacks are where an adversary standing behind the user, and possibly even
recording the user’s interactions, maybe able to observe and detect some pattern in
the image or from the user’s interactions, which will compromise the security of the
visual password. In the proposed visual OTP scheme, the visual pattern generated on
the mobile device to solve a challenge can only be used for that particular challenge.
The mobile device will generate different visual patterns for different challenges.
5.2 Limitations
In this section we discuss some of the limitations of the propose visual OTP scheme.
As with all visual challenges or passwords, the proposed scheme relies on the
human visual system. This means that it does not cater for the blind or visually
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impaired, and cannot be used by an individual with a visual disability. Another po-
tential disadvantage is that the challenge image will have to be displayed at a certain
size in order for the mobile device’s camera to be able to accurately capture the in-
formation contained within the challenge image. While this is not seen as a major
problem, it may adversely affect the layout or aesthetics of a message, document or
webpage.
It should be noted that the proposed scheme does not deal with man-in-the-
middle or similar attacks. To handle such attacks, the scheme can be combined with
other security protocols that are designed to handle man-in-the-middle attacks. In
addition, this approach also does not address the situation where the authentication
server is hacked. The server is responsible for its own security and it is assumed that
all the necessary security mechanisms are in place.
In the proposed scheme, the mobile device captures the challenge image using
its video stream and is responsible for overlaying the virtual image on top of the
challenge image. As such, it is assume that the mobile device has the computational
capabilities required to process augmented reality techniques in real-time. Addition-
ally, since the mobile device has to be used to visually present the solution to the
challenge, a separate means of displaying the challenge has to be employed. In other
words, if the user wants to conduct an online transaction via a web-browser, this can-
not be done using the mobile device’s web-browser as the mobile device itself will
have to be used in conjunction with the challenge’s display to obtain the OTP. How-
ever, this requirement is no different from several other authentication schemes that
were previously presented in Section 2 of this paper, which also require the use a
web-browser and a separate mobile phone to perform authentication.
6 Conclusion
In this book chapter, we presented the design of a challenge-response visual OTP
authentication scheme. Using this scheme, a challenge is sent to a registered indi-
vidual, this can be via a web-browser or even printed media, and the user can use
the camera and display of his mobile device to obtain the solution to the challenge.
This approach can be implemented on a variety of mobile devices, such as mobile
phones and tablets, with the main requirement being that the device must have a
camera. The challenge itself can be transmitted over a public channel without the
threat of it being compromised by an adversary, as the adversary can neither cor-
rectly generate nor solve the challenge. As such, the scheme does not suffer from
the common issues affecting the generation and delivery of OTPs such as mobile
phone reception, hash chain complexities or time synchronization mechanisms. In
addition, this scheme does not suffer from security issues like shoulder surfing at-
tacks or keyloggers, as the mobile device will generate the specific visual pattern
required to solve a particular challenge and will generate a different visual pattern
when presented with a different challenge.
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